
The role of Risk Management in EN IEC 62304 by Robert Ginsberg, QAdvis

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Introduction of the speaker

Robert.Ginsberg@QAdvis.com

- 30+ years in SW Development
- 20+ years in Medical Device SW
- Co-author of IEC 62304, 80001-1, 80002-1 and 80002-2
- Working member of Cenelek TK-62



Key competence areas

- Turn key quality systems
- Sharepoint based
- Digital signatures
- Efficient and lean
- Validated and compliant

QMS in-the-cloud

- Project management
- Product software validation
- Regulated software validation
- Requirement management
- Risk management
- Verification and validation
- SQA

System development

- Interim management
- Expert advise
- Audits/Mock audits/assessments
- Remediation, WL, Import detention, compliance projects
- PMA, 510k, CE-mark, EC-cert
- Vigilance, recall, post market surveillance
- Clinical evaluation/clinical expertise
- Standards (ISO 13485, ISO 14971, IEC 62304, IEC 62366, ...)

QA&RA Consulting

- CE-marking
- ISO 13485
- EN 62304
 - SW life cycle
 - Risk management
- QSR
- Lean and Six sigma

Training/courses

- Training and Consulting
- In cooperation with Oriel Stat a Matrix

Oriel - Lean and Six Sigma


- Providing European representation for non-EU MedTech companies
- Active member of EAAR: European Association of Authorised Representatives

European Authorized Representation

Before we start ...

- There will be time for questions after the presentation
- You can use the chat function to contact the convener, Sebnem Hoffsten
- More complicated question, please call or email:
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 - robert.ginsberg@qadvis.com

The Big Picture for software in a Medical Device regarding MDD




IEC 62304 calls for RM activities through the whole development lifecycle



QA and SW engineers have to find efficient implementation of IEC 62304




It is challenging to find a proper level of effort for SW RM



Risk mgmt can enable effective, safe and compliant V&V strategy



Use SW risk mgmt to regulate your efforts when testing the product



Governments and Agencies are enforcing new regulation across time

EU-Commission/US Government
MDD/Public Health Service Act


Agencies
Medical Products Agency/FDA

Laws and Regulations
SFS 1993:584/21 CFR 820

Guidance docs
Standards – 13485, 14971, 62304



The Bar is Raised Over Time



Patient journal mix up caused death of a young woman

Case report: Socialstyrelsen 2007

"When Sofie came into ER, the treating doctor used the wrong patient journal. In the computerized journal system at the hospital there were two patients with similar names and social security numbers. Based on the contents of the wrong journal Sofie was treated with drugs that led to her death."



There is a new version of EN 14971 addressing acceptance criteria

SS-EN ISO 14971:2012 (E)


3. Risk reduction "as far as possible" versus "as low as reasonably practicable":

- a) Annex D.8 to ISO 14971, referred to in 3.4, contains the concept of reducing risks "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP concept). The ALARP concept contains an element of economic consideration.
- b) However, the first indent of Section 2 of Annex I to Directive 93/42/EEC and various particular Essential Requirements require risks to be reduced "as far as possible" without there being room for economic considerations.
- c) Accordingly, manufacturers and Notified Bodies may not apply the ALARP concept with regard to economic considerations.

Quality assurance techniques have a long history in the industry



There is a migration of QA techniques to the Medical Device area




Medical Device guidelines


FDA is expecting static analyzers to be implemented as part of the V&V

MISRA-C:2004


- Guidelines for the use of the C language in critical systems
- October 2004



There is a number of techniques available for Risk Management



HAZOP Methodology use guide words as a “creativity trigger” for hazards




HAZOP can be used for detecting usability related hazards


Study title: Patient Journal retrieval						Page: of			
Drawing no.:			Rev no.:			Date:			
HAZOP team:						Meeting date:			
Part considered: Hospital information system									
Design intent:			Material: Source:		Activity: Destination:				
No.	Guide-word	Element	Deviation	Possible causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Comments	Actions required	Action allocated to
1	Other than	Patient Identification	Other patient than expected was selected	Similar social security number in picklist	Wrong treatment	Full social security no. has to be entered	Verification vs patient name still needed	Mandatory approval of correct patient name	RoGi

– Source: IEC 61882

Fault Tree Analysis is a top down technique useful at early stages



Example of a Fault Tree Analysis for: Doctor cannot access patient records




FMECA is a bottom up technique to find failure modes of components/items


Item	Potential Failure Mode	Potential Effects (of failure)	S/N	Cause	Potential Cause(s) (Mechanisms) of failure	Current Process Controls Prevention	Current Process Controls Detection	S/N	RPN	Recommended Actions	Responsibility & Target Completion Date	Actions Taken			
												Action Taken	Who	When	How
3 - Front Door LH	Internal application of wax inside door. To cover inner door, inner seal back at minimum was 30 degree to retard corrosion.	Internal seal was covering over specified surface. Unsatifactory appearance due to not through paint over time - impaired function of interior door handle etc.	1	Door is made of steel	Door is made of steel	Door is made of steel	Door is made of steel	1	100	Add protective depth clip to spray.		Step added spray protection.	1	1	1
					Spray head clogged - Jaw dry due to high temperature too low - Pressure too low			3	100	Test spray pattern as set up and after ride periods, and preventive maintenance program to clean fault.			1	1	1
					Spray head disformed due to impact			2	20	Preventive maintenance program to maintain the ads.			1	1	1
					Spray time insufficient			1	100	Operator instructions and test sampling (10 doors/10) to check for coverage of critical areas.			1	1	1

- Bottom up
- Risk ranking (probability * severity)
- Can become very detailed and cumbersome
- From the beginning oriented to HW
- Can be introduced when Items are defined


Items and units are the building blocks of a software system



Each manufacturer needs to find his own mix of techniques for Risk Mgmt



62304 calls for life cycle approach to risk mgmt based on ISO 14971



Risk Control Measures are expected to be expressed as requirements

- Evaluation of new risks due to implementation of RCMs
- Re-evaluation of RM file when appropriate regarding changes in requirements
- Update of system requirements when appropriate


Defining a safe architecture is one of the major tasks in the SW RM process

Safe architecture


- Proper partitioning
- Testable
- Predictable behavior
- "Flight recorder"
 - On lab
 - In field




Assurance of RCMs can be done with a number of techniques



Verification activities are expected to be planned upfront and fully executed




Two views to consider Functional reqs - architecture




Risk driven Item/Unit verification is an explicit expectation in 62304

- To do more test for risk related units
- Some guidance on how to implement this




Risk driven requirement verification is an underlying expectation in 62304


- To do more test for risk related features
- Significant freedom on how to implement this



Example on how Risk Analysis activities can relate to key documents



Example of an IPO diagram for Preliminary Hazard Analysis



It is very difficult to find probability for a SW failure



Software fails systematically

Random failures

- Ionizing radiation
- Wear out, fatigue


Systematic failures

- Software
- Incorrectly rated fuse

Consensus does not exist for a method of estimating systematic fault rates quantitatively!



Probability of SW to fail is expected to be 100%



The key message in 62304 is to do software engineering for safety

Safe design



Protective measures in device



Protective measures in process



Information

Risk based V&V strategy can utilize the resources efficiently



Example of a risk based requirement test strategy

Req class	A	B	C
Verification			
Scripted (Req Based)	M	M	M
Independent Review	O	M	M
Exploratory	O	O	M

- M = Mandatory O = Optional
- Risk control measures included in reqs

Class A: No injury or damage to health is possible

Class B: Non-SERIOUS INJURY is possible

Class C: Death or SERIOUS INJURY is possible

Example of risk based Item/Unit test strategy

Verification	Unit	In Item A	In Item B	In Item C
Rule check		M	M	M
Basic unit test		O	M	M
Review		O	M	M
100% Code coverage		O	O	M
Independent review		O	O	M


- M = Mandatory
- O = Optional

Class A: No injury or damage to health is possible
Class B: Non-SERIOUS INJURY is possible
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Software risk management can be time consuming and hard



Good software engineering is the key to successful risk management



A good starting point is to document what already is done

The MANUFACTURER shall document TRACEABILITY of software HAZARDS as appropriate:

- a) from the hazardous situation to the SOFTWARE ITEM;
- b) from the SOFTWARE ITEM to the specific software cause;
- c) from the software cause to the RISK CONTROL measure; and
- d) from the RISK CONTROL measure to the VERIFICATION of the RISK CONTROL measure.

Building a solid V&V process can enable productivity

Synergus can contribute with consulting within:

- Auditing and reviews
- Mentoring
- Risk manager role
- SQA role (Software Quality Assurance)
- Process development and documentation
- Product documentation
- Implementation of supporting IT-tools

